From f6e5759be574c2f9d2c2617ad0a5552ed58ec9d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: jaseg <git-bigdata-wsl-arch@jaseg.de>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 19:02:15 +0200
Subject: Initialize paper tex

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+\documentclass[nohyperref]{iacrtrans}
+\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
+\usepackage[
+    backend=biber,
+    style=numeric,
+    natbib=true,
+    url=false, 
+    doi=true,
+    eprint=false
+    ]{biblatex}
+\addbibresource{safety-reset.bib}
+\usepackage{amssymb,amsmath}
+\usepackage{eurosym}
+\usepackage{wasysym}
+\usepackage{amsthm}
+
+\usepackage[binary-units]{siunitx}
+\DeclareSIUnit{\baud}{Bd}
+\DeclareSIUnit{\year}{a}
+\usepackage{commath}
+\usepackage{graphicx,color}
+\usepackage{subcaption}
+\usepackage{array}
+\usepackage{hyperref}
+
+\renewcommand{\floatpagefraction}{.8}
+\newcommand{\degree}{\ensuremath{^\circ}}
+\newcolumntype{P}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
+\newcommand{\partnum}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\title[Ripples in a Pond]{Transmitting Information through Grid Frequency Modulation}
+\author{Jan Sebastian Götte \and Björn Scheuermann}
+\institute{HIIG\\ \email{safetyreset@jaseg.de} \and HU Berlin \\ \email{scheuermann@informatik.hu-berlin.de}}
+% FIXME keywords
+\keywords{hardware security \and energy systems \and signal theory}
+\maketitle
+
+\begin{abstract}
+\end{abstract}
+
+\section{Introduction}
+
+In the power grid, as in many other engineered systems, we can observe an ongoing diffusion of information systems into
+industrial control systems. Automation of these control systems has already been practiced for the better part of a
+century.  Throughout the 20th century this automation was mostly limited to core components of the grid. Generators in
+power stations are computer-controlled according to electromechanical and economic models. Switching in substations is
+automated to allow for fast failure recovery. Human operators are still vital to these systems, but their tasks have
+shifted from pure operation to engineering, maintenance and surveillance\cite{crastan03,anderson02}.
+
+With the turn of the century came a large-scale trend in power systems to move from a model of centralized generation,
+built around massive large-scale fossil and nuclear power plants, towards a more heterogenous model of smaller-scale
+generators working together. In this new model large-scale fossil power plants still serve a major role, but two new
+factors come into play. One is the advance of renewable energies. The large-scale use of wind and solar power in
+particular from a current standpoint seems unavoidable for our continued existence on this planet. For the electrical
+grid these systems constitute a significant challenge. Fossil-fueled power plants can be controlled in a precise and
+quick way to match energy consumption. This tracking of consumption with production is vital to the stability of the
+grid. Renewable energies such as wind and solar power do not provide the same degree of controllability, and they
+introduce a larger degree of uncertainty due to the unpredictability of the forces of nature\cite{crastan03}.
+
+Along with this change in dynamic behavior, renewable energies have brought forth the advance of distributed generation.
+In distributed generation end-customers that previously only consumed energy have started to feed energy into the grid
+from small solar installations on their property. Distributed generation is a chance for customers to gain autonomy and
+shift from a purely passive role to being active participants of the electricity market\cite{crastan03}.
+
+To match this new landscape of decentralized generation and unpredictable renewable resources the utility industry has
+had to adapt itself in major ways. One aspect of this adaptation that is particularly visible to ordinary people is the
+computerization of end-user energy metering. Despite the widespread use of industrial control systems inside the
+electrical grid and the far-reaching diffusion of computers into people's everyday lives the energy meter has long been
+one of the last remnants of an offline, analog time. Until the 2010s many households were still served through
+electromechanical Ferraris-style meters that have their origin in the late 19th
+century\cite{borlase01,ukgov04,bnetza02}.  Today under the umbrella term \emph{Smart Metering} the shift towards fully
+computerized, often networked meters is well underway. The roll out of these \emph{Smart Meters} has not been very
+smooth overall with some countries severely lagging behind. As a safety-critical technology, smart metering technology
+is usually standardized on a per-country basis. This leads to an inhomogenous landscape with--in some instances--wildly
+incompatible systems.  Often vendors only serve a single country or have separate models of a meter for each country.
+This complex standardization landscape and market situation has led to a proliferation of highly complex, custom-coded
+microcontroller firmware. The complexity and scale of this--often network-connected--firmware makes for a ripe substrate
+for bugs to surface.
+
+A remotely exploitable flaw inside a smart meter's firmware\footnote{
+    There are several smart metering architectures that ascribe different roles to the component called \emph{smart
+    meter}. Not all systems are susceptible to attacks to the same degree, with the German implementation being almost
+    immune as far as energy availability is concerned. For clarity, we use \emph{smart meter} to describe the entire
+    system at the customer premises including both the meter and if present a gateway.
+} could have consequences ranging from impaired billing functionality to an existential threat to grid
+stability\cite{anderson01,anderson02}. In a country where meters commonly include disconnect switches for purposes such
+as prepaid tariffs a coördinated attack could at worst cause widespread activation of grid safety systems by repeatedly
+connecting and disconnecting megawatts of load capacity in just the wrong moments\cite{wu01}.
+
+Mitigation of these attacks through firmware security measures is unlikely to yield satisfactory results. The enormous
+complexity of smart meter firmware makes firmware security extremely labor-intensive. The diverse standardization
+landscape makes a coördinated, comprehensive response unlikely.
+
+In this paper, instead of focusing on the very hard task of improving firmware security we introduce a pragmatic
+solution to the--in our opinion likely--scenario of a large-scale compromise of smart meter firmware. In our proposal
+the components of the smart meter that are threatened by remote compromise are equipped with a physically separate
+\emph{safety reset controller} that listens for a reset command transmitted through the electrical grid's frequency and
+on reception forcibly resets the smart meter's entire firmware to a known-good state.  Our safety reset controller
+receives commands through Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) modulation carried out on grid frequency through a
+large controllable load such as an aluminum smelter. After forward error correction and cryptographic verification it
+re-flashes the meter's main microcontroller over the standard JTAG interface.  Note that our modulation technique is one
+\emph{changing grid frequency itself}.  This is fundamentally different in both generation and detection from systems
+such as traditional PLC that superimpose a signal on grid voltage, but leave grid frequency itself unaffected.
+
+In this thesis, starting from a high level architecture we have carried out extensive simulations of our proposal's
+performance under real-world conditions. Based on these simulations we implemented an end-to-end prototype of our
+proposed safety reset controller as part of a realistic smart meter demonstrator. Finally we experimentally validated
+our results and we will conclude with an outline of further steps towards a practical implementation.
+
+This work contains the following contributions:
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item We introduce Grid Frequency Modulation (GFM) as a communication primitive. % FIXME done before in that one paper
+    \item We elaborate the fundamental physics underlying GFM and theorize on the constrains of a practical
+        implementation.
+    \item We design a communication system based on GFM.
+    \item We carry out extensive simulations of our systems to determine its performance characteristics.
+    \item We show the simple grid voltage recorder design we used to capture data for our simulations.
+    \item We introduce a new, simplified method to determine grid frequency from a capture of the grid voltage waveform
+        that is simple to implement on constrained embedded devices.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\section{Related work} 
+\label{sec_related_work}
+
+\section{Conclusion}
+\label{sec_conclusion} 
+
+\printbibliography[heading=bibintoc]
+
+%%% FIXME remove appendix and work into text.
+
+\center{
+    \center{This is version \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip} of this paper, generated on \today. The git repository
+    can be found at:}
+
+    \center{\url{https://git.jaseg.de/safety-reset.git}}
+}
+\end{document}
-- 
cgit 

