Initial commit

4 files changed, 515 insertions, 461 deletions

diff --git a/ma/Makefile b/ma/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3645f5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ma/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+
+SHELL := bash
+.ONESHELL:
+.SHELLFLAGS := -eu -o pipefail -c
+.DELETE_ON_ERROR:
+MAKEFLAGS += --warn-undefined-variables
+MAKEFLAGS += --no-builtin-rules
+
+all: safety_reset.pdf
+
+%.pdf: %.tex %.bib
+	pdflatex $<
+	biber $* 
+	pdflatex $<
+
+.PHONY: clean
+clean:
+	rm -f safety_reset.aux safety_reset.bbl safety_reset.bcf safety_reset.log safety_reset.blg
+	rm -f safety_reset.out safety_reset.run.xml texput.log 
diff --git a/ma/murks.tex b/ma/murks.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c3527e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ma/murks.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+% LaTeX-Vorlage für die Titelseite und Selbständigkeitserklärung einer Abschlussarbeit
+% basierend auf der vorigen Institutsvorlage des Instituts für Informatik
+% sowie der Vorlage für Promotionsarbeiten.
+%
+% erweitert: 2014-06-12 Dennis Schneider <dschneid@informatik.hu-berlin.de>
+
+% gepunktete Linie unter Objekt:
+\newcommand{\TitelPunkte}[1]{%
+  \tikz[baseline=(todotted.base)]{
+    \node[inner sep=1pt,outer sep=0pt] (todotted) {#1};
+    \draw[dotted] (todotted.south west) -- (todotted.south east);
+  }%
+}%
+
+% gepunktete Linie mit gegebener Länge:
+\newcommand{\TitelPunktLinie}[1]{\TitelPunkte{\makebox[#1][l]{}}}
+
+\makeatletter
+
+\newcommand*{\@titelTitel}{Titel der Arbeit}
+\newcommand{\titel}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelTitel}{#1}} % Titel der Arbeit
+\newcommand*{\@titelArbeit}{Arbeitstyp}
+\newcommand{\typ}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelArbeit}{#1}} % Typ der Arbeit
+\newcommand*{\@titelGrad}{akademischer Grad}
+\newcommand{\grad}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGrad}{#1}} % Akademischer Grad
+\newcommand*{\@titelAutor}{Autor}
+\newcommand{\autor}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelAutor}{#1}} % Autor der Arbeit
+\newcommand*{\@titelGeburtsdatum}{\TitelPunktLinie{2cm}}
+\newcommand{\gebdatum}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGeburtsdatum}{#1}} % Geburtsdatum des Autors
+\newcommand*{\@titelGeburtsort}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
+\newcommand{\gebort}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGeburtsort}{#1}} % Geburtsort des Autors
+\newcommand*{\@titelGutachterA}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
+\newcommand*{\@titelGutachterB}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
+\newcommand{\gutachter}[2]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGutachterA}{#1}\renewcommand*{\@titelGutachterB}{#2}} % Erst- und Zweitgutachter
+\newcommand*{\@titelEinreichungsdatum}{\TitelPunktLinie{3cm}} % Datum der Einreichung, wird nicht vom Studenten ausgefüllt
+\newcommand*{\@titelVerteidigungsdatum}{} % Verteidigungstext, wird nicht vom Studenten ausgefüllt
+\newcommand{\mitverteidigung}{\renewcommand*{\@titelVerteidigungsdatum}{verteidigt am: \,\,\TitelPunktLinie{3cm}}} % Verteidigungsplatzhalter erzeugen
+\newcommand*{\@wastwoside}{}
+
+% Titelseite erzeugen:
+\newcommand{\makeTitel}{%
+	% Speichere, ob doppelseitiges Layout gewählt wurde:
+\if@twoside%
+	\renewcommand*{\@wastwoside}{twoside}
+\else
+	\renewcommand*{\@wastwoside}{twoside=false}
+\fi
+	\begin{titlepage}
+		% Ändern der Einrückungen
+		\newlength{\parindentbak} \setlength{\parindentbak}{\parindent}
+		\newlength{\parskipbak} \setlength{\parskipbak}{\parskip}
+		\setlength{\parindent}{0pt}
+		\setlength{\parskip}{\baselineskip}
+
+		\thispagestyle{empty}
+
+		\begin{minipage}[c][3cm][c]{12cm}
+			\textsc{%
+				% optischer Randausgleich per Hand:
+				\hspace{-0.4mm}\textls*[68]{\Large Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin}\\
+				\normalsize \textls*[45]{
+					Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät\\
+					Institut für Informatik
+				}
+			}
+		\end{minipage}
+		\hfill
+
+
+		% Also wenn schon serifenlose Schriften (Titel), dann ganz oder gar nicht
+		\sffamily
+
+		\vfill
+
+		\begin{center}
+		\begin{doublespace}
+			\vspace{\baselineskip}
+			{\LARGE \textbf{\@titelTitel}}\\
+			%\vspace{1\baselineskip}
+			{\Large
+				\@titelArbeit\\
+				zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades\\
+				\@titelGrad
+				\vspace{\baselineskip}
+			}
+		\end{doublespace}
+		\end{center}
+
+		\vfill
+\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
+		{\large \raggedleft
+			\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{l@{\,\,\raggedright~}L} % verbreiterter Abstand zwischen Feldern wurde gewünscht
+				eingereicht von: & \@titelAutor\\
+				geboren am: & {\@titelGeburtsdatum}\\
+				geboren in: & \@titelGeburtsort
+				\vspace{0.5\baselineskip}\\
+				Gutachter/innen: & \@titelGutachterA \\
+					& \@titelGutachterB
+				\vspace{0.5\baselineskip}\\
+				eingereicht am: & \@titelEinreichungsdatum \hfill \@titelVerteidigungsdatum
+			\end{tabularx}}
+			\vspace{-1\baselineskip}\\\phantom{x} % Übler Hack, um eine Warnung wg. einer zu leeren hbox zu verhindern
+		% Wiederherstellen der Einrückung
+		\setlength{\parindent}{\parindentbak}
+		\setlength{\parskip}{\parskipbak}
+	\end{titlepage}
+
+	% Aufräumen:
+	\let\@titelTitel\undefined
+	\let\titel\undefined
+	\let\@titelArbeit\undefined
+	\let\typ\undefined
+	\let\@titelGrad\undefined
+	\let\grad\undefined
+	\let\@titelAutor\undefined
+	\let\autor\undefined
+	\let\@titelGeburtsdatum\undefined
+	\let\gebdatum\undefined
+	\let\@titelGeburtsort\undefined
+	\let\gebort\undefined
+	\let\@titelGutachterA\undefined
+	\let\@titelGutachterB\undefined
+	\let\gutachter\undefined
+	\let\@titelEinreichungsdatum\undefined
+	\let\einreichungsdatum\undefined
+	\let\@titelVerteidigungsdatum\undefined
+	\let\verteidigungsdatum\undefined
+
+	\let\@wastwoside\undefined
+	\cleardoublepage % ganzes Blatt für die Titelseite
+}
+
+% Als Allerallerletztes kommt Selbständigkeitserklärung:
+% Aufruf mit dem Datum in deutscher und englischer Form
+\newcommand{\selbstaendigkeitserklaerung}[1]{%
+	\cleardoublepage% Wieder auf eine eigene Doppelseite
+	{\parindent0cm
+		\subsection*{Selbständigkeitserklärung}
+		Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig verfasst
+		und noch nicht für andere Prüfungen eingereicht habe.
+		Sämtliche Quellen einschließlich Internetquellen, die unverändert oder
+		abgewandelt wiedergegeben werden, insbesondere Quellen für Texte, Grafiken,
+		Tabellen und Bilder, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Mir ist bekannt,
+		dass bei Verstößen gegen diese Grundsätze ein Verfahren wegen
+		Täuschungsversuchs bzw. Täuschung eingeleitet wird.
+		\vspace{3\baselineskip}
+
+		{\raggedright Berlin, den #1 \hfill \TitelPunktLinie{8cm}\\}
+%		\vspace{3\baselineskip}
+%
+% 		\selectlanguage{english}
+% 		\subsection*{Statement of authorship}
+% 		Hier würde die englische Selbständigkeitserklärung folgen, falls gewünscht. Doch es fehlt eine akzeptable Übersetzung.
+% 		\vspace{3\baselineskip}
+%
+% 		Berlin, #2 \hfill \TitelPunktLinie{6cm}
+	}
+}%
+
+\makeatother
diff --git a/ma/safety_reset.tex b/ma/safety_reset.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41b511b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ma/safety_reset.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+\documentclass[12pt,a4paper,notitlepage]{report}
+\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
+\usepackage[a4paper,textwidth=17cm, top=2cm, bottom=3.5cm]{geometry}
+\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
+\usepackage[
+    backend=biber,
+    style=numeric,
+    natbib=true,
+    url=true, 
+    doi=true,
+    eprint=false
+    ]{biblatex}
+\addbibresource{safety_reset.bib}
+\usepackage{amssymb,amsmath}
+\usepackage{listings}
+\usepackage{eurosym}
+\usepackage{wasysym}
+\usepackage{amsthm}
+\usepackage{tabularx}
+\usepackage{multirow}
+\usepackage{multicol}
+\usepackage{tikz}
+
+\usetikzlibrary{arrows}
+\usetikzlibrary{backgrounds}
+\usetikzlibrary{calc}
+\usetikzlibrary{decorations.markings}
+\usetikzlibrary{decorations.pathreplacing}
+\usetikzlibrary{fit}
+\usetikzlibrary{patterns}  
+\usetikzlibrary{positioning}
+\usetikzlibrary{shapes}
+
+\usepackage{hyperref}
+\usepackage{tabularx}
+\usepackage{commath}
+\usepackage{graphicx,color}
+\usepackage{subcaption}
+\usepackage{float}
+\usepackage{footmisc}
+\usepackage{array}
+\usepackage[underline=false]{pgf-umlsd}
+\usetikzlibrary{calc}
+%\usepackage[pdftex]{graphicx,color}
+%\usepackage{epstopdf}
+% Needed for murks.tex
+\usepackage{setspace}
+\usepackage[draft=false,babel,tracking=true,kerning=true,spacing=true]{microtype} % optischer Randausgleich etc.
+% For german quotation marks
+
+\newcommand{\foonote}[1]{\footnote{#1}}
+\newcommand{\degree}{\ensuremath{^\circ}}
+\newcolumntype{P}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+% Beispielhafte Nutzung der Vorlage für die Titelseite (bitte anpassen):
+\input{murks}
+\titel{FIXME} % Titel der Arbeit
+\typ{Masterarbeit} % Typ der Arbeit:  Diplomarbeit, Masterarbeit, Bachelorarbeit
+\grad{Master of Science (M. Sc.)} % erreichter Akademischer Grad
+% z.B.: Master of Science (M. Sc.), Master of Education (M. Ed.), Bachelor of Science (B. Sc.), Bachelor of Arts (B. A.), Diplominformatikerin
+\autor{Jan Sebastian Götte}
+\gebdatum{Aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen nicht abgedruckt} % Geburtsdatum des Autors
+\gebort{Aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen nicht abgedruckt} % Geburtsort des Autors
+\gutachter{Prof. Dr. Björn Scheuermann}{FIXME} % Erst- und Zweitgutachter der Arbeit
+\mitverteidigung % entfernen, falls keine Verteidigung erfolgt
+\makeTitel
+\selbstaendigkeitserklaerung{31.03.2020}
+\newpage
+
+% Hier folgt die eigentliche Arbeit (bei doppelseitigem Druck auf einem neuen Blatt):
+\tableofcontents
+\newpage
+
+\chapter{Introduction}
+\section{Structure and operation of the electrical grid}
+\subsection{Structure of the electrical grid}
+\subsubsection{Generators and loads}
+\subsubsection{Transformers}
+\subsubsection{Tie lines}
+
+\subsection{Operational concerns}
+\subsubsection{Modelling the electrical grid}
+\subsubsection{Generator controls}
+\subsubsection{Load shedding}
+\subsubsection{System stability}
+\subsubsection{Power System Stabilizers}
+
+\subsubsection{Smart metering}
+
+\section{Regulatory frameworks around the world}
+\subsection{International standards}
+\subsection{Regulations in Europe}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in Germany}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in France}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in the UK}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in Italy}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in northern America}
+\subsection{The regulatory situation in Japan}
+\subsection{Common themes}
+
+\section{Security in smart grids}
+The smart grid in practice is nothing more or less than an aggregation of embedded control and measurement devices that
+are part of a large control system. This implies that all the same security concerns that apply to embedded systems in
+general also apply to most components of a smart grid in some way. Where programmers have been struggling for decades
+now with input validation\cite{leveson01}, the same potential issue raises security concerns in smart grid scenarios as
+well\cite{mo01, lee01}.  Only, in smart grid we have two complicating factors present: Many components are embedded
+systems, and as such inherently hard to update. Also, the smart grid and its control algorithms act as a large
+(partially-)distributed system, making problems such as input validation or authentication difficult to
+implement\cite{blaze01} and adding a host of distributed systems problems on top\cite{lamport01}.
+
+Given that the electrical grid is a major piece of essential infrastructure in modern civilization, these problems
+amount to significant issues in practice. Attacks on the electrical grid may have grave consequences\cite{lee01} all the
+while the long maintenance cycles of various components make the system slow to adapt. Thus, components for the smart
+grid need to be built to a much higher standard of security than most consumer devices to ensure they live up to
+well-funded attackers even decades down the road. This requirement intensifies the challenges of embedded security and
+distributed systems security among others that are inherent in any modern complex technological system.
+
+\subsection{Smart grid components as embedded devices}
+A fundamental challenge in smart grid implementations is the central role smart electricity meters play. Smart meters
+are used both for highly-granular load measurement and (in some countries) load switching\cite{zheng01}.
+Smart electricity meters are effectively consumer devices. They are built down to a certain price point that is
+measured by the burden it puts on consumers and that is generally fixed by regulatory authorities. % FIXME cite
+This requirement precludes some hardware features such as the use of a standard hardened software environment on a
+high-powerded embedded system (such as a hypervirtualized embedded linux setup) that would both increase resilience
+against attacks and simplify updates. Combined with the small market sizes in smart grid deployments
+\footnote{
+    Most vendors of smart electricity meters only serve a handful of markets. For the most part, smart meter development
+    cost lies in the meter's software % TODO cite?
+    and most countries use their own home-grown standards, creating a large development burden for new market entrants
+    \cite{cenelec01}.
+}
+this produces a high cost pressure on the software development process for smart electricity meters.
+
+\subsection{The state of the art in embedded security}
+Embedded security generally is much harder than security of higher-level systems. This is due to a combination of the
+unique constraints of embedded devices (hard to update, usually small quantity) and their lack of capabilities
+(processing power, memory protection functions, user interface devices). Even very well-funded companies continue to
+have serious problems securing their embedded systems. A spectacular example of this difficulty is the recently-exposed
+flaw in Apple's iPhone SoC first-stage ROM bootloader\footnote{
+    Modern system-on-chips integrate one or several CPUs with a multitude of peripherals, from memory and DMA
+    controllers over 3D graphics accelerators down to general-purpose IO modules for controlling things like indicator
+    LEDs. Most SoCs boot from one of several boot devices such as flash memory, ethernet or USB according to a
+    configuration set e.g. by connecting some SoC pins a certain way or set by device-internal write-only fuse bits.
+
+    Physically, one of the processing cores of the SoC (usually one of the main CPU cores) is connected such that it is
+    taken out of reset before all other devices, and is tasked with switching on and configuring all other devices of
+    the SoC. In order to run later intialization code or more advanced bootloaders, this core on startup runs a very
+    small piece of code hard-burned into the SoC in the factory. This ROM loader initializes the most basic peripherals
+    such as internal SRAM memory and selects a boot device for the next bootloader stage.
+
+    Apple's ROM loader performs some authorization checks, to ensure no unauthorized software is loaded. The present
+    flaw allows an attacker to circumvent these checks, booting code not authorized by Apple on a USB-connected iPhone,
+    compromising Apple's chain of trust from ROM loader to userland right at its root.
+}, that allows a full compromise of any iPhone before the iPhone X. iPhone 8, one of the affected models, is still being
+manufactured and sold by Apple today\footnote{
+    i.e. at the time this paragraph was written, on %FIXME
+}. In another instance, Samsung put a flaw in their secure-world firmware used for protection of sensitive credentials
+in their mobile phone SoCs in % FIXME year % .
+If both of these very large companies have trouble securing parts of their secure embedded software stacks measuring a
+mere few hundred bytes in Apple's case or a few kilobytes in Samsung's, what is a smart electricity meter manufacturer
+to do? For their mass-market phones, these two companies have R\&D budgets that dwarf some countries' national budgets.
+% FIXME hyperbole?
+% FIXME cite
+
+Since thorough formal verification of code is not yet within reach for either large-scale software development or
+code heavy in side-effects such as embedded firmware or industrial control software\cite{pariente01}
+the two most effective measures for embedded security is reducing the amount of code on one hand, and labour-intensively
+checking and double-checking this code on the other hand. A smart electricity manufacturer does not have a say in the
+former since it is bound by the official regulations it has to comply with, and will almost certainly not have sufficient
+resources for the latter.
+% FIXME expand?
+% FIXME cite some figures on code size in smart meter firmware?
+
+\subsection{Attack avenues in the smart grid}
+If we model the smart grid as a control system responding to changes in inputs by regulating outputs, on a very high
+level we can see two general categories of attacks: Attacks that directly change the state of the outputs, and attacks
+that try to influence the outputs indirectly by changing the system's view of its inputs. The former would be an attack
+such as one that shuts down a power plant to decrease generation capacity. The latter would be an attack such as one
+that forges grid frequency measurements where they enter a power plant's control systems to provoke increasing
+oscillation in the amount of power generated by the plant according to the control systems' directions.
+% FIXME cite
+% FIXME expand
+
+\subsubsection{Communication channel attacks}
+Communication channel attacks are attacks on the communication links between smart grid components. This could be
+attacks on IP-connected parts of the core network or attacks on shared busses between smart meters and IP gateways in
+substations. Generally, these attacks can be mitigated by securing the aforementioned communication links using modern
+cryptography. IP links can be protected using TLS, and more low-level busses can be protected using more lightweight
+Noise-based protocols. % FIXME cite
+Cryptographic security transforms an attackers ability to manipulate communication contents into a mere denial of
+service attack. Thus, in addition to cryptographic security safety under DoS conditions must be ensured to ensure
+continued system performance under attacks. This safety property is identical with the safety required to withstand
+random outages of components, such as communications link outages due to physical damage from storms, flooding etc.
+% FIXME cite papers on attack impact, on coutermeasures and on attack realization
+
+\subsubsection{Exploiting centralized control systems}
+The type of smart grid attack most often cited in popular discourse, and to the author's knowledge % FIXME verify, cite
+the only type that has so far been conducted in practice, is a direct attack on centralized control systems. In this
+attack, computer components of control systems are compromised by the same techniques used to compromise any other kind
+of computer system such as exploiting insecure services running on internet-exposed ports and using one compromised
+system to compromised other systems connected with it through an ostensably secure internal network. These attacks are
+very powerful as they yield the attacker direct control over whatever outputs the control systems are controlling. If an
+attacker manages to compromise a power stations control computers, they may be able to influence generation output or
+even cause an emergency shutdown. % FIXME
+
+Despite their potentially large impact, these attacks are only moderately interesting from a scientific perspective. For
+one, their mitigation mostly consists of a straightforward application of security practices well-known for decades.
+Though there is room for the implementation of genuinely new, application-specific security systems in this field, the
+general state of the art is lacking behind the rest of the computer industry such that the low-hanging fruit should take
+priority. % FIXME cite this bold claim very properly
+
+In addition, given political will these systems can readily be secured since there is only a comparatively small number
+of them and driving a technician to every one of them in turn to install some security update is perfectly feasible.
+
+\subsubsection{Control function exploits}
+Control function exploits are attacks on the mathematical control loops used by the centralized control system. One
+example of such an attack would be resonance attacks as described in \textcite{wu01}.
+In this kind of attack, inputs from peripheral sensors indicating grid load to the centralized control system are
+carefully modified to cause a disproportionally large oscillation in control system action. This type of attack relies
+on complex resonance effects that arise when mechanical generators are electrically coupled. These resonances,
+coloquially called ``modes'' are well-studied in power system engineering\cite{rogers01,grebe01,entsoe01}.
+% FIXME: refer to section on stability control above here
+Even disregarding modern attack scenarios, for stability electrical grids are designed with measures in place to dampen
+any resonances inherent to grid structure. Still, requiring an accurate grid model these resonances are hard to analyze
+and unlikely to be noiticed under normal operating conditions.
+
+Mitigation of these attacks is most easily done by on the one hand ensuring unmodified sensor inputs to the control
+systems in the first place, and on the other hand carefully designing control systems not to exhibit exploitable
+behavior such as oscillations.
+% FIXME cite mitigation approaches
+
+\subsubsection{Endpoint exploits}
+One rather interesting attack on smart grid systems is one exploiting the grid's endpoint devices such as smart
+electricity meters\footnote{
+    Though potentially this could also aim at other kinds of devices distributed on a large scale such as sensors in
+    unmanned substations. % FIXME cite verify
+}
+These meters are deployed on a massive scale, with several thousand meters deployed for every substation.
+% FIXME cite (this should be straightforward)
+Thus, once compromised restoration to an uncompromised state can be potentially very difficult if it requires physical
+access to thousands of devices hidden inaccessible in private homes.
+
+By compromising smart electricity meters, an attacker can trivially forge the distributed energy measurements these
+devices perform. In a best-case scenario, this might only affect billing and lead to customers being under- or
+over-charged if the attack is not noticed in time. However, in a less ideal scenario the energy measurements taken by
+these devices migth be used to inform the grid centralized control systems % FIXME cite (straightforward)
+and a falsification of these measurements might lead to inefficiency or even instability.
+
+In some countries and for some customers, these smart meters have one additional function that is highly useful to an
+attacker: They contain high-current load switches to disconnect the entire household or business in case electricity
+bills are left unpaid for a certain period. In countries that use these kinds of systems, the load disconnect is often
+simply hooked up to one of the smart merter's central microcontroller's general-purpose IO pins, allowing anyone
+compromising this microcontroller's firmware to actuate the load switch at will. % FIXME validate cite add pictures
+
+Given control over a large number of network-connected smart meters, an attacker might thus be able to cause large-scale
+disruptions of power consumption by repeatedly disconnecting and re-connecting a large number of consumers.
+% FIXME cite some analysis of this
+Combined with an attack method such as the resonance attack from \textcite{wu01}
+that was mentioned above, this scenario poses a serious danger to grid stability.
+
+% FIXME add small-scale load shedding for heaters etc.
+
+\subsection{Attacker models in the smart grid}
+\subsection{Practical attacks}
+\subsection{Practical threats}
+\subsection{Conclusion, or why we are doomed}
+
+\chapter{Restoring endpoint safety in an age of smart devices}
+\section{The theory of endpoint safety}
+\subsection{Attack characteristics}
+\subsection{Complex microcontroller firmware}
+\subsection{Modern microcontroller hardware}
+\subsection{Regulatory and economical constraints}
+\subsection{Safety vs. Security: Opting for restoration instead of prevention}
+\subsection{Technical outline of a safety reset}
+
+\section{Communication channels on the grid}
+\subsection{Powerline communication systems and their use}
+\subsection{Proprietary wireless systems}
+\subsection{Landline IP}
+\subsection{IP-based wireless systems}
+\subsection{Frequency modulation as a communication channel}
+\subsubsection{The frequency dependance of grid frequency}
+\subsubsection{Control systems coupled to grid frequency}
+\subsubsection{Avoiding dangerous modes}
+\subsubsection{Overall system parameters}
+\subsubsection{An outline of practical implementation}
+
+\section{From grid frequency to a reliable communications channel}
+\subsection{Channel properties}
+\subsection{Modulation and its parameters}
+\subsection{Error-correcting codes}
+\subsection{Cryptographic security}
+
+\chapter{Practical implementation}
+\section{Cryptographic validation}
+
+\section{Data collection for channel validation}
+\subsection{Frequency sensor hardware design}
+\subsection{Frequency sensor measurement results}
+
+\section{Channel simulation and parameter validation}
+
+\section{Implementation of a demonstrator unit} 
+
+\section{Experimental results}
+
+\section{Lessons learned}
+
+\chapter{Future work}
+\section{Technical standardization}
+\section{Regulatory adoption}
+\section{Practical implementation}
+
+\newpage
+\appendix
+\chapter{Acknowledgements}
+\newpage
+
+\chapter{References}
+\nocite{*}
+\printbibliography
+\newpage
+
+\chapter{Demonstrator schematics and code}
+
+\chapter{Economic viability of countermeasures}
+\section{Attack cost}
+\section{Countermeasure cost}
+\section{Conclusion}
+
+\chapter{The ethics and security implications of centralized crackdown on energy theft}
+
+\end{document}
diff --git a/smart_meter_reset.bib b/smart_meter_reset.bib
deleted file mode 100644
index d1e1e7d..0000000
--- a/smart_meter_reset.bib
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
-@online{bnetza1,
-	author = {Bundesnetzagentur},
-	publisher = {Bundesnetzagentur},
-	title = {Smart Meter},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100204/https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Verbraucher/NetzanschlussUndMessung/SmartMetering/SmartMeter_node.html},
-	urldate = {2019-09-19},
-	year = {2019}
-}
-
-@online{bmwi1,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik} and {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie}},
-	month = jan,
-	publisher = {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie},
-	title = {Standardisierungsstrategie zur sektor{\"u}bergreifenden Digitalisierung nach dem Gesetz zur Digitalisierung der Energiewende},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100713/https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/standardisierungsstrategie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
-	urldate = {2019-09-19},
-	year = {2019}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = nov,
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102010/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2015}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = jan,
-	number = {v1.0.1},
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-1: Anforderungen an die Interoperabilit{\"a}t der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102217/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109-1.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2019}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-6,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = nov,
-	number = {v1.0},
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-6: Smart Meter Gateway Administration},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102651/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-6-Smart_Meter_Gateway_Administration.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2015}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-4,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = aug,
-	number = {v1.2.1},
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-4: Public Key Infrastruktur f{\"u}r Smart Meter Gateways},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102649/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-4_PKI.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2017}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-2,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = dec,
-	number = {v1.1},
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102644/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Anforderungen_an_die_Funktionalitaet.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2014}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-3,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	month = apr,
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102648/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-3_Kryptographische_Vorgaben.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2014}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-I,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage I: CMS-Datenformat f{\"u}r die Inhaltsdatenverschl{\"u}sselung und -signatur},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-II,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage II: COSEM/HTTP Webservices},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2012}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIb,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil b: {\glqq}OMS Technical Report Security``},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIa,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil a: {\glqq}OMS Specification Volume 2, Primary Communication``},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110054/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVa,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil a: {\glqq}HDLC f{\"u}r LMN``},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVb,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil b: {\glqq}SML Smart Message Language``},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110756/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_Feinspezifikation\_Drahtgebundene\_LMN-Schnittstelle\_Teilb.pdf jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VI,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = mar,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VI: Betriebsprozesse},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111203/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Betriebsprozesse.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2013}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VII,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = jan,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VII: Interoperabilit{\"a}tsmodell und Ger{\"a}teprofile f{\"u}r Smart-Meter- Gateways},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111350/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Interop-Modell-Geraeteprofile.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2019}
-}
-
-@online{bsi-tr-03109-2-a,
-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.1},
-	month = dec,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang A: Smart Meter Gateway Sicherheitsmodul Use Cases},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111540/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Sicherheitsmodul_Use_Cases.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2014}
-}
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-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
-	edition = {v1.0},
-	month = jun,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang B: Smart Meter Mini-HSM Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111832/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2_Anhang_B_Smart_Meter_Mini_HSM.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2017}
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-	author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
-	booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r Projekte der Bundesregierung},
-	month = jan,
-	organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
-	title = {TR-03116-3: Intelligente Messsysteme},
-	url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112052/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03116/BSI-TR-03116-3.pdf; jsessionid=CB56FC0D3137C5624CA697AB9E57671F.1_cid360?__blob=publicationFile&v=9},
-	urldate = 2019-09-19,
-	year = {2019}
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-	month = jan,
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-	title = {TR-03109-TS-1: Testkonzept zu BSI TR-03109-1},
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-	issn = {},
-	keywords = {power consumption; power engineering computing; power system measurement; power system security; security of data; smart meters; energy theft techniques; power energy consumption; electric energy distribution; electricity theft detection; energy consumers; cyber security; smart metering; low voltage network; Energy consumption; Security; Energy measurement; Companies; Power systems; Wheels; Smart Grid; energy theft; cyber-physical security; digital data flow; energy hacking},
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-	x-color = {#009966},
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-}
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