From c6fc46736d2e41466a52307ca748d7bed0597854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: jaseg <git@jaseg.de>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 13:46:56 +0200
Subject: Cosmetic changes

---
 paper/ihsm_paper.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'paper/ihsm_paper.tex')

diff --git a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex
index 375b096..cb70164 100644
--- a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex
+++ b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ feed-through as potential weak spots.
 The third and last way to attack a conventional HSM is to disable the mesh monitoring circuit~\cite{dexter2015}. An
 attacker may need to insert several probes to wiretap the payload processor's secrets, but if poorly implemented, they
 may be able to disable the mesh monitor with only one. This type of attack can be mitigated by careful electronic
-design.
+design that avoids single points of failure as well as fail-open failure modes.
 
 \subsection{Attacks that work on any HSM}
 
-- 
cgit 

