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| -rw-r--r-- | paper/ihsm_paper.tex | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | paper/tches-22-01-changes.tex | 48 |
2 files changed, 57 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex index f4cea28..e69cec3 100644 --- a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex +++ b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex @@ -111,19 +111,19 @@ This paper contains the following contributions: \begin{figure} \center \includegraphics[width=12cm]{prototype_pic2.jpg} - \caption{The protoype as we used it to test power transfer and bidirectional communication between stator and rotor. - This picture shows the proof of concept prototype's configuration that we used for accelerometer characterization - (Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas}) without the vertical security mesh struts that connect the circular top and bottom - outer meshes.} + \caption{The prototype as we used it to test power transfer and bidirectional communication between stator and + rotor. This picture shows the proof of concept prototype's configuration that we used for accelerometer + characterization (Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas}) without the vertical security mesh struts that connect the circular + top and bottom outer meshes.} \label{prototype_picture} \end{figure} In Section~\ref{sec_related_work}, we will give an overview of the state of the art in HSM physical security. On this basis, in Section~\ref{sec_ihsm_construction} we will elaborate the principles of our Inertial HSM approach. We will analyze its weaknesses in Section~\ref{sec_attacks}. Based on these results we have built a proof of concept hardware -prototype, whose design we will elaborate in Section~\ref{sec_proto}. In Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas} we present our -characterization of an automotive MEMS accelerometer IC as a rotation sensor in this proof of concept prototype. We -conclude this paper with a general evaluation of our design in Section~\ref{sec_conclusion}. +prototype.In Section~\ref{sec_proto} we will elaborate the design of this prototype. In Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas} we +present our characterization of an automotive MEMS accelerometer IC as a rotation sensor in this proof of concept +prototype. We conclude this paper with a general evaluation of our design in Section~\ref{sec_conclusion}. \section{Related work} \label{sec_related_work} @@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ An HSM in principle has to have this examination equipment built-in. Physical seals are used in a wide variety of applications, but the most interesting ones from a research point of view that are recorded in public literature are those used in monitoring of nuclear material under the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Most of these seals use the same approach that is used in Physically -Uncloneable Functions (PUFs), though their development predates that of PUFs by several decades. The seal is created in -a way that intentionally causes large, random device to device variations. These variations are precisely recorded at +Unclonable Functions (PUFs), though their development predates that of PUFs by several decades. The seal is created in a +way that intentionally causes large, random device to device variations. These variations are precisely recorded at deployment. At the end of the seal's lifetime, the seal is returned from the field to the lab and closely examined to check for any deviations from the seal's prior recorded state. The type of variation used in these seals includes random scratches in metal parts and random blobs of solder (IAEA metal cap seal), randomly cut optical fibers (COBRA seal), the @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ al.~\cite{tobisch2020}\ is that they use commodity WiFi hardware to reduce the c resulting system is likely both much cheaper and capable of protecting a much larger security envelope than designs using finely patterned foil security meshes such as~\cite{immler2019}, at the cost of worse and less predictable security guarantees. Where~\cite{tobisch2020} use electromagnetic radiation, Vrijaldenhoven -in~\cite{vrijaldenhoven2004} uses ultrasound waves travelling on a surface acoustic wave (SAW) device to a similar end. +in~\cite{vrijaldenhoven2004} uses ultrasound waves traveling on a surface acoustic wave (SAW) device to a similar end. While Tobisch et al.~\cite{tobisch2020}\ approach the sensing frontend cost as their primary optimization target, the prior work of Kreft and Adi~\cite{kreft2012} considers sensing quality. Their target is an HSM that envelopes a volume @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ is the widespread industry use of delicate tamper sensing mesh membranes. The us deployed in the field for a variety of use cases from low security payment processing devices to high security certificate management at a minimum tells us that a properly implemented mesh \emph{can} provide a practical level of security. On the other hand, in contrast to this industry focus, academic research has largely focused on ways to -fabricate enclosures that embed characteristics of a Physically Uncloneable Function. By using stochastic properties of +fabricate enclosures that embed characteristics of a Physically Unclonable Function. By using stochastic properties of the enclosure material to form a PUF, such academic designs effectively leverage signal processing techniques to improve the system's security level by a significant margin. @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) can be used, but in practice a productized IH integrated into its case. Conservatively assuming an average operating power consumption of $\SI{10}{\watt}$ for an IHSM's motor, a single large laptop battery with a capacity of $\SI{100}{\watt\hour}$~\cite{faa2018} could already power an IHSM for 10 hours continuously. $\SI{10}{\watt}$ is a reasonable high estimate given that there are large industrial -fans rated at lower wattages. For example, \texttt{CF2207LBL-000U-HB9}, a $\SI{250}{\milli\meter}$ diameter +fans rated at lower wattages. For example, \partnum{CF2207LBL-000U-HB9}, a $\SI{250}{\milli\meter}$ diameter $\SI{7.8}{\meter^3\per\minute}$ industrial axial fan made by Sunon is rated at only $\SI{6.6}{\watt}$\footnote{\url{https://www.digikey.com/en/products/detail/sunon-fans/CF2207LBL-000U-HB9/9083282}}. If a built-in battery is undesirable, or if power outages of more than a few seconds at a time are unlikely (e.g.\ because @@ -438,15 +438,15 @@ the IHSM. People working in the datacenter might bump the IHSM. Vibrations from couple through the ground into the datacenter and into the IHSM. Finally, earthquakes are a common occurrence in some regions of the world and will couple through any reasonable amount of vibration damping. -There are two key points to note on vibration damping. One, the instantaneous mechanical power of a vibrating motion +There are two key points to note on vibration damping. First, the instantaneous mechanical power of a vibrating motion is proportional to the square of its amplitude when fixing frequency and the cube of its frequency when fixing amplitude. This means that to reach a certain instantaneous acceleration, much more power is needed in a high-frequency -vibrating motion compared to lower frequencies. This observation interacts the second key point we want to note here: -An ideal vibration damper works better with higher frequencies, and has a lower bound below which it does no longer -damp vibration transmission~\cite{kelly1993,beards1996,dixon2007}. From these two observations it follows that if we -wish to reduce the likelihood of false detections by our IHSM tamper alarm, we can achieve this goal efficiently by -damping high-frequency shock and vibration, as low-frequency shock or vibration components will not reach accelerations -large enough to cause a false alarm. +vibrating motion compared to lower frequencies. This observation interacts with our other point that, second, an ideal +vibration damper works better with higher frequencies, and has a lower bound below which it does no longer damp +vibration transmission~\cite{kelly1993,beards1996,dixon2007}. From these two observations it follows that if we wish to +reduce the likelihood of false detections by our IHSM tamper alarm, we can achieve this goal efficiently by damping +high-frequency shock and vibration, as low-frequency shock or vibration components will not reach accelerations large +enough to cause a false alarm. To put this into perspective, consider an IHSM running at an angular frequency of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$. If the IHSM's tamper sensor is mounted at a radius of $\SI{100}{\milli\meter}$ from the axis of rotation, it will measure a constant @@ -584,9 +584,9 @@ is hard. Let us assume a small IHSM mesh with radius $r=\SI{100}{\milli\meter}$. To keep a manipulator stationary within a $\SI{5}{\milli\meter}$ by $\SI{5}{\milli\meter}$ window over a period of $\SI{10}{\second}$ requires attack tool and IHSM speeds to be matched to an accuracy better than $\frac{\SI{5}{\milli\meter}}{\SI{10}{\second}} \cdot \frac{1}{2\pi r} = \SI{8.0}{\milli\hertz} = \SI{0.048}{rpm}$. -Relative to a realsistic IHSM's speed of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$ this corresponds to approximately $\SI{50}{ppm}$. -Achieving this accuracy would likely require active servo control of the attack tool's rotation that is locked by -optically tracking of the IHSM's rotor. +Relative to a realistic IHSM's speed of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$ this corresponds to approximately $\SI{50}{ppm}$. Achieving +this accuracy would likely require active servo control of the attack tool's rotation that is locked by optically +tracking of the IHSM's rotor. If an attacker were to solve the tracking issue, the remaining issue is that they still need to construct a remote-controlled manipulator that can be mounted on the attack tool's rotating stage that is able to disable the IHSM's @@ -778,16 +778,16 @@ requires $\SI{10}{\milli\ampere}$ of active current, this yields an average oper $\SI{100}{\micro\ampere}$. This value is comparable to a reasonable estimation of the current consumption of the monitoring circuit itself. In our prototype we used ST Microelectronics STM32 Series ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers. To get an estimate on the current consumption of an energy-optimized design we will refer to the datasheet of the -\texttt{STM32L486JG}\footnote{\url{https://www.st.com/resource/en/datasheet/stm32l486jg.pdf}}, a representative member -of ST's \texttt{STM32L4} low-power sub-family that provides hardware acceleration for AES256. A good target for an +\partnum{STM32L486JG}\footnote{\url{https://www.st.com/resource/en/datasheet/stm32l486jg.pdf}}, a representative member +of ST's \partnum{STM32L4} low-power sub-family that provides hardware acceleration for AES256. A good target for an implementation of a secure cryptographic channel on this device would be the noise protocol framework~\cite{perrin2018}. While the initial handshake for key establishment uses elliptic-curve cryptography and may take several hundred milliseconds~\cite{tschofenig2015}, the following payload data transfer messages require only symmetric cryptographic -primitives. The \texttt{STM32L486JG} datasheet lists the microcontroller's typical operating current at around +primitives. The \partnum{STM32L486JG} datasheet lists the microcontroller's typical operating current at around $\SI{8}{\milli\ampere}$ at $\SI{48}{\mega\hertz}$ clock speed, and lists a sleep current of less than $\SI{1}{\micro\ampere}$ in low-power standby mode with RTC enabled. The AES peripheral is listed with less than $\SI{2}{\micro\ampere\per\mega\hertz}$ typical current consumption. A typical high-$g$ accelerometer for an IHSM -application would be ST Microelectronics' \texttt{H3LIS331DL}. Its +application would be ST Microelectronics' \partnum{H3LIS331DL}. Its datasheet\footnote{\url{https://www.st.com/resource/en/datasheet/h3lis331dl.pdf}} lists a typical current consumption between $\SI{10}{\micro\ampere}$ in low-power mode with output sampling rate up to $\SI{10}{\hertz}$ and $\SI{300}{\micro\ampere}$ in normal operating mode with output sampling rate up to $\SI{1}{\kilo\hertz}$. Given the low @@ -817,14 +817,14 @@ Besides power transfer from stator to rotor, we need a reliable, bidirectional d low-latency heartbeat signal. We chose to transport an $\SI{115}{\kilo\baud}$ UART signal through a simple IR link for a quick and robust solution. The link's transmitter directly drives a standard narrow viewing angle IR led through a transistor. The receiver has an IR PIN photodiode reverse-biased at $\frac{1}{2}V_\text{CC}$ feeding into an -\texttt{MCP6494} general purpose opamp configured as an $\SI{100}{\kilo\ohm}$ transimpedance amplifier. As shown in +\partnum{MCP6494} general purpose opamp configured as an $\SI{100}{\kilo\ohm}$ transimpedance amplifier. As shown in Figure \ref{photolink_schematic}, the output of this TIA is amplified one more time before being squared up by a comparator. Our design trades off stator-side power consumption for a reduction in rotor-side power consumption by using a narrow-angle IR led and photodiode on the rotor, and wide-angle components at a higher LED current on the stator. Figure~\ref{ir_tx_schema} shows the physical arrangement of both links. The links face opposite one another and are shielded from one another by the motor's body in the center of the PCB. -% We used an \texttt{MCP6494} quad CMOS op-amp. At a specified $\SI{2}{\milli\ampere}$ current +% We used an \partnum{MCP6494} quad CMOS op-amp. At a specified $\SI{2}{\milli\ampere}$ current % consumption it is within our rotor's power budget, and its Gain Bandwidth Product of $\SI{7.5}{\mega\hertz}$ yields a % useful transimpedance in the photodiode-facing TIA stage. @@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ Our prototype IHSM uses a motor controller intended for use in RC quadcopters. I control this motor controller through an RC servo tester. In our experiments we externally measured the device's speed of rotation using a magnet fixed to the rotor and a reed switch held close. The reed switch output is digitized using an USB logic analyzer at a sample rate of $\SI{100}{\mega\hertz}$. We calculate rotation frequency as a -$\SI{1}{\second}$ running average over debounced interval lengths of this captured signal\footnote{A regular frequency +$\SI{1}{\second}$ running average over interval lengths of the debounced captured signal\footnote{A regular frequency counter or commercial tachometer would have been easier, but neither was available in our limited COVID-19 home office lab.}. @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ allow the construction of devices secure against a wide range of practical attac specialized tools. The rotating mesh allows longitudinal gaps, which enables new applications that are impossible with traditional HSMs. Such gaps can be used to integrate a fan for air cooling into the HSM, allowing the use of powerful computing hardware inside the HSM. We hope that this simple construction will stimulate academic research into (more) -secure hardware. We have published all design artifacts of our PoC online, please refer to Appendix~\ref{sec_repo} for +secure hardware. We published all design artifacts of our PoC online, please refer to Appendix~\ref{sec_repo} for details. The next steps towards a practical application of our design will be to design a manufacturable stator/rotor interface with inductive power and data transfer integrated into the motor's magnetics and a custom motor driver tuned for the application that is able to precisely measure both angular velocity and winding current for an added degree of diff --git a/paper/tches-22-01-changes.tex b/paper/tches-22-01-changes.tex index e26f169..ddbc6d0 100644 --- a/paper/tches-22-01-changes.tex +++ b/paper/tches-22-01-changes.tex @@ -43,33 +43,37 @@ \subtitle{Changes of Major Revision compared to version submitted to TCHES 21/4} \maketitle -This document lists the requested revisions we identified from the reviewers comments and explains how we adressed these -requests. +We again wish to express our deep gratitude for the reviewers' profound insights and valuable feedback in the TCHES 21/4 +review round. After the program committee's ``major revision'' decision we have reflected upon our submission with the +new insights we have gained from the reviewers' comments. In the remainder of this document, we will list the requested +changes that we have identified from the reviewers' helpful comments and explain how we adressed these requests in the +enclosed major revision of our submission. We hope that by extensively reworking our initial submission we have improved +it to the satisfaction of the reviewers and program committee. \paragraph{Lack of discussion of operational constraints.} -As pointed out by Reviewer~B, our initial submission lacked a detailed discussion of the operational constraints of -Inertial Hardware Security Modules. We have adressed this with more than two pages of new content on the operation of -IHSMs in the new Sections~3.5 ``Long-Term Operation'' and~3.6 ``Transportation''. In these sections we address the -reviewers' points on the continuous power supply requirement and go into detail on the likelihood of spurious tamper -alarms triggered by external vibrations. Section~3.5 also addressses Reviewer~B's comments on failover, backup and -replication of cryptographic secrets. +As pointed out by Reviewers~A and~B, our initial submission lacked a detailed discussion of the operational constraints of +Inertial Hardware Security Modules. We thank the reveiwer for this helpful observation. We have adressed this with more +than two pages of new content on the operation of IHSMs in the new Sections~3.5 ``Long-Term Operation'' and~3.6 +``Transportation''. In these sections we address the reviewers' points on the continuous power supply requirement and go +into detail on the likelihood of spurious tamper alarms triggered by external vibrations. Section~3.5 also addresses +Reviewer~B's comments on failover, backup and replication of cryptographic secrets. \paragraph{Lack of discussion of improved cooling capabilities of IHSMs compared to traditional HSMs.} As Reviewer~D pointed out, our initial submission alluded to the possibility of facilitating cooling airflow through an IHSM's security mesh and noted that this would allow for greater processing capabilities, but did not go into detail on -the extent of this effect. In our revised paper, we have extended Section~3.4 ``Mechanical Layout'' with an -order-of-magnitude estimation of this effect based on real-world benchmarks and information available from vendors of -traditional HSMs. +the extent of this effect. To address this valid remark, in our revised paper, we have extended Section~3.4 ``Mechanical +Layout'' with an order-of-magnitude estimation of this effect based on real-world benchmarks and information available +from vendors of traditional HSMs. \paragraph{Mechanical Rotating Stage Attacks.} As pointed out by Reviewer~D, in our original submission our discussion of the Swivel Chair Attack discusses attacks by by a rotating human attacker in depth and mentions the possibility of a fully mechanized attack robot. However, our -initial submission did not go into detail on the constraints of such a fully mechanized attack. In our revised paper we -have completed our discussion in this section with one half page of new content and one new diagram discussing -fully mechanized attack robots. +initial submission did not go into detail on the constraints of such a fully mechanized attack. We are grateful to the +reviewer for pointing out the lack of detail in this regard. In our revised paper we have completed our discussion in +this section with one half page of new content and one new diagram discussing fully mechanized attack robots. \paragraph{Comparison of IHSM attacks to those on traditional HSMs.} @@ -80,15 +84,17 @@ response, we have significantly extended Section~4 ``Attacks'' with one page of reader. \paragraph{Notes on future work.} + Reviewer~D stated that they would find an outlook on the next design steps towards a practically usable design interesting. We have adressed this at the end of Section~7 ``Conclusion'' to the extent of our current plans. \paragraph{Design Artifact Availability.} -Reviewer~D state that acceess to design artifacts would be useful for readers of the paper. While we cannot make our + +Reviewer~D stated that acceess to design artifacts would be useful for readers of the paper. While we cannot make our design artifacts available as part of the peer review process as they contain a multitude of references to the -identities of the authors and their employer, we have added a brief appendix that in the publication version of our -paper will contain a link to the open-source repository containing all hardware, software and paper sources relating to -our research project. +identities of the authors and their employer, we have added a brief appendix that the publication version of our +paper will contain with a link to the open-source repository containing all hardware, software and paper sources +relating to our research project. \paragraph{Detailed discussion of contactless attacks.} @@ -101,8 +107,8 @@ it can provide to its payload. \paragraph{Justification of mesh monitor power consumption estimates.} -A point noted by Reviewer~B is that in our initial submission we provided an estimate on the current consumption of an -IHSM monitoring cirucit without providing a detailed justification of our estimate. In response, we have extended -Section~5.3 ``Power transmission from Stator to rotor'' with a more detailed justification of this estimate. +A point noted by Reviewers~A and~B is that in our initial submission we provided an estimate on the current consumption +of an IHSM monitoring cirucit without providing a detailed justification of our estimate. In response, we have extended +Section~5.3 ``Power transmission from stator to rotor'' with a more detailed justification of this estimate. \end{document} |