diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | paper/diffinator.py | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | paper/ihsm_paper.tex | 2 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/paper/diffinator.py b/paper/diffinator.py index a54e844..70907d5 100644 --- a/paper/diffinator.py +++ b/paper/diffinator.py @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 import re +import sys import subprocess import string @@ -61,8 +62,7 @@ def generate_git_tex_diff(texfile, bibliography, revision): line = line.rstrip() if document_started: # diff results in preamble - import sys - debug = 'battery' in line + debug = False #'battery' in line if debug: print('orig:', repr(line), file=sys.stderr) diff --git a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex index 375b096..cb70164 100644 --- a/paper/ihsm_paper.tex +++ b/paper/ihsm_paper.tex @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ feed-through as potential weak spots. The third and last way to attack a conventional HSM is to disable the mesh monitoring circuit~\cite{dexter2015}. An attacker may need to insert several probes to wiretap the payload processor's secrets, but if poorly implemented, they may be able to disable the mesh monitor with only one. This type of attack can be mitigated by careful electronic -design. +design that avoids single points of failure as well as fail-open failure modes. \subsection{Attacks that work on any HSM} |